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The incentives of senior bank managers need to be altered in
order to make them more risk averse
David Kershaw, Tom Kirchmaier and Edmund Schuster argue that we need to alter the basic incentive
structures of senior managers in systemically important financial institutions. For starters, there should be
no bonuses and no performance-related pay of any form.
Another banking crisis, another predictable regulatory response: more sanctions; stronger enf orcement;
an inquiry; and yet more disappointment about shareholders’ f ailure to monitor managers and hold them
to account. Through this f og of  outrage and disappointment we continue to ignore the most basic of
economic lessons. Lessons that would help us avoid another sub-prime crisis or Libor scandal. To
paraphrase Bill Clinton, “it ’s about the incentives, stupid”.
The incentives of  senior bank managers are the primary drivers of  bank behaviour and strategy. Senior
managers in any bank determine the bank’s relationship to risk. Their actions inf orm f ellow members of
credit committees and more junior employees about the nature of  acceptable risk taking, the types of
business the bank should be involved in and the types of  behaviour that will please the senior managers.
Yet, the basic incentives that structure the behaviour and signals of  senior managers in systemically
important UK banks are f undamentally wrong.
UK company law clearly instructs managers to promote the interests of  shareholders and only
shareholders. It also governs the board’s relationship with shareholders through a set of  shareholder
rights that are more powerf ul than in any other advanced economy. The UK Stewardship Code cajoles
institutional shareholders to actively exercise these rights and to behave more like owners. UK pay
regulation directs banks to align pay with shareholder pref erences. But while company law and pay
regulation promotes the primacy of  shareholder interests, the interests of  shareholders in systemically
important banks are at odds with those of  the broader society.
As is generally known, equity has option like characteristics that means that it is in the interests of
shareholders that their companies take more risk. If  the risks pay of f  shareholders take the gains, if  they
do not the creditors are lef t nursing their losses. In the real world of  course creditors will not let f irms
get away with this. That is, we should say, in the non-banking real world. Bank creditors do not discipline
banks because they assume they will be bailed out by the state, and the ult imate creditor (the state)
does not demand payment f or this implicit guarantee. Accordingly, incentive structures that give primacy
to shareholder interests – even interests of  diversif ied long-term shareholders – will drive the types of
risk taking and associated behaviour that the crisis has revealed to be unacceptable. The term “moral
hazard” does not do justice to the nature and extent of  this distortion.
Regulation that does not f undamentally alter these incentive structures is incapable of  preventing
unacceptable and economically inef f icient risk-taking. A strategy of  f irst giving primacy to shareholder
interests and then trying to mitigate the negative consequences of  the pursuit of  those interests
through minimum capital levels, liquidity ratios and the like is doomed to f ail. As we have seen, such rules
will be gamed and the spirit of  the rules undermined. Regulators do not, and will not, have the resources
nor the skill set to play catch-up with the market place. They will always be one step behind and when the
public outrage subsides the gaming will resume until the next round of  outrage and regulatory tweaking.
We need then to alter the basic incentive structures of  senior managers in relation to systemically
important f inancial institutions. If  a dif f erent incentive structure f or senior managers can create a cadre
of  boring but ef f ective utility banks servicing retail and business customers then the “too big to f ail
subsidy” f or other institutions would be drastically reduced as the f ailure of  a non-systemic bank would
not threaten the f unctioning of  the payment system or spill over into the real economy. Only where these
conditions are met can the government credibly commit to lett ing banks f ail. Accordingly, we suggest a
set of  changes that would only be applicable to banks determined to be systemically important by the
Bank of  England.
We propose three changes. First, the corporate objective of  a systemically important bank must be
changed. The directors should act to promote “the interests of  the company” understood as the
interests of  all bank stakeholders (including shareholders). Shareholder interests would not be granted
priority.
Even if  bank managers are required to promote the interests of  all stakeholders, shareholders’
appointment and removal rights are likely to ensure that their interests in practice still come a clear f irst.
The extent to which managers f eel that they have room to promote the interests of  other stakeholders
is a f unction of  the strength of  shareholder rights. In the UK these rights are particularly strong. For
example, the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends only one-year terms f or directors, and they
can be removed without cause by a simple majority of  the votes cast at a shareholder meeting. Without
weaker shareholder rights merely altering the corporate objective would be of  limited consequence.
There are many ways in which such rights could be dampened. For example, we could revert to classif ied
boards with three year terms and instead of  removal rights being linked to a simple majority of  the votes
cast the law could instead require a majority of  the shares actually issued. Such a proposal runs counter
to one of  the rote responses to the crisis: that we need more powerf ul and active shareholders. This is
a baf f ling response equivalent to giving control of  the f ire brigade to a class which is predisposed to
building f ires. Of  course not all shareholders will actively push managers to exploit the “too big to f ail
subsidy” but some will. Bank managers of  systemically important banks need less exposure to
shareholder pressure not more.
Finally, all executive directors and all senior managers who are not also directors and all equivalent
managers of  all subsidiaries would only receive a salary. No bonuses, no perf ormance-related pay of  any
f orm. Pensions would vest only at the statutory retirement age. Salaries would be set by the
remuneration committee in the normal way. Lower- level employees could be paid perf ormance-related pay
as regulated by the FSA’s Remuneration Code. What would be the ef f ects of  such a radical step? Most
importantly, the primary personal incentives of  senior managers would be to keep their job. There would
be no bonuses to cushion any f all. This would incentivise senior managers to run the bank in a way which
generates prof its – to keep shareholders happy enough – whilst minimising the risk of  bank f ailure and
bank scandals.
Such managers would be risk averse. They would dispose of  excessively risky activit ies and would not
allow innovative risky activit ies to commence. Over t ime banks run by managers with these incentives
would implement the separation of  commercial and investment banking but in a f ar more ef f ective way
than a ban on proprietary trading or the ring-f encing of  investment banking activit ies. This is because it
would be implemented by insiders incentivised to take these activit ies of f  the bank’s balance sheet.
Implemented by insiders who know the bank’s business and not by regulators who struggle to
understand what is and what is not proprietary trading or which side of  a ring-f ence a particular activity
should f all upon.
But wouldn’t such an approach to remuneration undermine the generation of  value? To a degree, indeed
it would; that is the point – the creation of  a core of  saf e UK banks that provide the basic banking
f unction of  oiling the wheels of  commerce. But wouldn’t such a bank be unable to attract talent? No, it
would result in the attraction of  the right talent: conservative and risk-averse managers not creative risk
takers. The economy needs those risk takers – but not in systemically important banks.
These incentive solutions are simple and obvious. They would need to be implemented caref ully and over
time. Why they have not been considered at all is inexplicable.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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